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Many recent articles argue that participants who seroconvert during HIV
prevention trials deserve treatment when they develop AIDS, and there is a
general consensus that the participants in HIV/AIDS treatment trials should
have continuing post-trial access. As a result, the primary concern of many
ethicists and activists has shifted from justifying an obligation to treat trial
participants, to working out mechanisms through which treatment could be
provided. In this paper I argue that this shift frequently conceals an impor-
tant assumption: that if there is an obligation to supply treatment, then any
party who could provide it may be prevailed upon to discharge the obliga-
tion. This assumption is false. The reasons why trial participants should get
ART affect who has the duty to provide it. We should not burden govern-
ments with the obligations of sponsors, nor researchers with the obligations
of the international community. And we should not deprive a group of
treatment because their need is less salient than that of research partici-




Everyone agrees that people with AIDS deserve to be
treated. Unfortunately, despite a recent flood of resources
to combat HIV/AIDS in the developing world, not every-
one who needs treatment gets it. In December 2007, of the
9.7 million people in urgent need of treatment for HIV/
AIDS in low- and middle-income countries, only about 3
million of them received it.1 Until antiretroviral therapy is
universally available, difficult decisions must be made
about how to direct limited resources, and strategies must
be found to increase them.
Participants in HIV/AIDS research comprise one
group that might have a special claim to antiretroviral
therapy (ART). In a slew of recent articles it has been
argued that participants who seroconvert during HIV
prevention trials deserve treatment when they develop
AIDS,2 and there is a general consensus that the parti-
cipants in HIV/AIDS treatment trials should have
1 AVERT. 2008. AIDS Treatment Targets and Results: All by 2010.
Available at: http://www.avert.org/aidstarget.htm [Accessed 26 Jan
2009].
2 E.g. B. Lo, N. Padian & M. Barnes. The Obligation to Provide Anti-
retroviral Treatment in HIV Prevention Trials. AIDS 2007; 21: 1229–
1231; R. Macklin. Changing the Presumption: Providing ART to
Vaccine Research Participants. AJOB 2006; 6(1): W1–W5; U.
Schüklenk & R. Ashcroft. International Research Ethics. Bioethics
2000; 14: 158–172.
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continuing post-trial access.3 As a result, the primary
concern of many ethicists and activists has shifted from
justifying an obligation to treat trial participants, to
working out mechanisms through which treatment could
be provided.
In this paper I argue that this shift often conceals an
important assumption: that if there is an obligation to
supply treatment, then any party who could provide it
may be prevailed upon to discharge the obligation. This
assumption is false. I enumerate the different justifica-
tions that have been proposed for an obligation to
provide ART to HIV/AIDS trial participants and show
what, if sound, each would justify.4 In general, I con-
clude, justifications that would place the onus on gov-
ernment programs imply that the governments would
have similar obligations to people outside of medical
research. They are unlikely to justify simply shifting
resources from non-participants to participants. On the
other hand, justifications that would imply an obliga-
tion owed just to research participants tend to be those
that obligate just the researchers and their sponsors.
Were these duties substantial enough to include the pro-
vision of ART, they would require increasing the total
resources directed to HIV/AIDS treatment. Awareness
of these implications should encourage more critical
reflection on exactly who has obligations to supply
treatment and to whom they are obligated. Ignoring
them risks unjustly depriving some people of treatment
to which they are entitled.
2. Treatment and prevention
For the most part, HIV/AIDS treatment trials test anti-
retroviral drugs, drug regimens, and mechanisms to
improve adherence to these regimens. Prevention trials
are more variable: they may test behavioral interven-
tions, vaccines, microbicides, surgical interventions, and
so on. Since AIDS is currently incurable, participants in
HIV/AIDS treatment trials leave the trial still needing
treatment. And at the end of a successful HIV preven-
tion trial, some participants are likely to have con-
tracted HIV: late-phase prevention trials typically rely
on showing a difference in infections between experi-
mental and comparison arms to show that an experi-
mental intervention is effective. Thus, trials of both
types will conclude with participants who need, or will
need, treatment.
It is worth noting two of the key differences between
treatment and prevention trials that can be relevant to
the arguments made in favor of post-trial treatment for
participants. First and foremost, the study population
for treatment trials starts the trial infected, and the
study population for prevention trials starts uninfected.
This has implications, for example, concerning what
sorts of harms can be caused by trial participation and
so what sorts of injuries researchers and sponsors could
be responsible for. Second, in treatment trials all the
participants need treatment directly following the trial,
but following prevention trials there is generally a sub-
stantial time-lag before those who seroconvert require
treatment. This presents additional practical difficulties
in discharging an obligation to provide ART.5 Despite
these differences, however, arguments citing the same
moral factors have been or could be developed for
both treatment and prevention trials in order to justify
an obligation to supply infected participants with post-
trial access to ART. Hence, for the most part I deal
simultaneously with arguments for post-trial access for
participants in both trial types. I note along the way
where the differences between them make a moral
difference.
In both cases this paper focuses on the extent of the
obligation to supply ART to trial participants who need
it, where supplying ART includes paying for antiretrovi-
ral drugs, but also providing or supporting the medical
personnel and other resources that are needed to actually
deliver them. There are, of course, other ways in which
people suffering from HIV/AIDS may need help, and so
other possible obligations of care to trial participants.
These include counseling, treatment of opportunistic
infections, monitoring of patients’ health status, assis-
tance with accessing medical care elsewhere, and so forth.
I focus on supplying ART because it has become the focal
issue for the debate over obligations of care to HIV/AIDS
trial participants. However, as I note in the conclusion,
my arguments apply equally well to other forms of care
and other care might be necessary or sufficient for the
discharge of certain obligations.
3 See, e.g. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2002. The Ethics of
Research Related to Health Care in Developing Countries. London:
Nuffield Council on Bioethics: 120–121; World Medical Association.
2008. Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects: Paragraph 33.
4 Assessment of the soundness of these arguments has been attempted
elsewhere, and so, for the most part, I do not replicate it here. For some
comprehensive critical evaluations see C. Slack et al. Provision of HIV
Treatment in HIV Prevention Trials: A Developing Country Perspec-
tive. Soc Sci Med 2005; 60: 1197–1208; C. Weijer & G.J. LeBlanc. The
Balm of Gilead: Is the Provision of Treatment to those Who Serocon-
vert in HIV Prevention Trials a Matter of Moral Obligation or Moral
Negotiation? J Law Med Ethics Winter 2006: 793–808. I note other
critical work as I consider particular arguments. 5 See Section 3.
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3. How might ART be supplied?
Various possible mechanisms for supplying post-trial
ART to participants have been proposed.6 These
include:
(1) The investigators or their sponsors provide ART
using research funds or other sources.
(2) The investigators or their sponsors pay for private
insurance, contribute to a fund to pay for treating
participants, or contribute the costs of treating par-
ticipants to governmental programs.
(3) The trial participants are enrolled into further
(treatment) trials.
(4) The participants are referred to government health
services that supply ART, possibly with support and
monitoring by researchers and/or sponsors.7
(5) Governments prioritize former research participants
in their national AIDS plans.
(6) International aid is preferentially directed towards
supplying ART to HIV/AIDS trial participants, or
to countries that host trials. This may be govern-
mental or non-governmental and bi-lateral or multi-
lateral aid.8
(7) Some combination of the above mechanisms. For
example, sponsors may agree to supply ART for a
set period and then have national governments take
over.
These mechanisms indicate the different parties who
may be in a position to provide ART: the investigators,
their sponsors, local or national governments, and
national and international (governmental or non-
governmental) aid agencies. They also reflect practical
difficulties with providing treatment. The development of
antiretroviral drugs has transformed AIDS from an acute
and deadly disease into a chronic condition. In the devel-
oped world, on average, a 20 year-old starting treatment
can now expect to live another 43 years.9 Meeting an
obligation to supply ART to trial participants is therefore
a long-term undertaking. But in the developing countries
in which many HIV/AIDS trials occur, not only may the
medicines be unavailable, but the infrastructure through
which to deliver them may be inadequate or non-existent.
Providing access to ART therefore requires addressing
shortages of clinics, monitoring equipment, and trained
personnel, in addition to supplying the drugs themselves.
Moreover, in some countries political and economic
instability makes it hard to predict the future healthcare
environment, which makes planning long-term care even
more challenging. Treating participants who seroconvert
in prevention trials is likely to exacerbate these concerns,
since, as noted above, these people will generally not need
treatment until a number of years after the trial. Unsur-
prisingly, therefore, many of the suggested mechanisms
make use, in whole or in part, of government treatment
programs.
4. The disconnect in the literature
The practical difficulties just noted are acknowledged in
the literature that argues in favor of an obligation to
provide ART to needy research participants. But in sug-
gesting ways to solve the practical problems – that is,
mechanisms for supplying ART – commentators often
fail to respect the reasons they have given for providing
treatment in the first place. Instead, they appear to
believe that which parties ought to supply ART is
simply determined by considerations of practicality.
For example, in a recent article in AIDS on prevention
trials, Lo et al. argue that:
There are ethical as well as pragmatic reasons for this
expectation of ART for seroconverters . . . The more
direct, frequent, and prolonged the research-
participant interaction during an HIV prevention trial,
the stronger the researcher’s sense of responsibility to
provide ART to participants who seroconvert during
the study. Moreover participants in a clinical trial
deserve reasonable benefits in return for their partici-
pation as a matter of reciprocal justice.10
Concerned that preferentially targeting participants
would be unjust, Lo et al. propose that resources for
ART be directed towards local or national programs, not
just research participants. For example, they suggest that
6 See J. Ananworanich et al. Creation of a Drug Fund for Post-Clinical
Trial Access to Antiretrovirals. Lancet 2004; 364: 101–102; E. Bass.
Raising Hopes and Many Questions: Vaccine Trial Sponsors’ New
Approaches to Providing Antiretrovirals for Trial Volunteers. IAVI
Report September 2003–January 2004; S. Berkley. Thorny Issues in the
Ethics of AIDS Vaccine Trials. Lancet 2003; 362: 992; D.W. Fitzgerald
et al. Provision of Treatment in HIV-1 Vaccine Trials in Developing
Countries. Lancet 2003; 362: 993–4; Lo et al. op. cit. note 2; T. Tucker
& C. Slack. Not If but How? Caring for HIV-1 Vaccine Trial Partici-
pants in South Africa. Lancet 2003; 362: 995.
7 Cf. A. Forbes. Moving Toward Assured Access to Treatment in
Microbicide Trials. PLoS Med 2006; 3(7): e153.
8 Examples include the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), and the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. This approach is mooted in Lo et al. op. cit. note 2.
9 R. Hogg et al. Life Expectancy of Individuals on Combination Anti-
retroviral Therapy in High-income Countries: a Collaborative Analysis
of 14 Cohort Studies. Lancet 2008; 372: 293–299.
10 Lo et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 1229.
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‘the US government should make PEPFAR funds avail-
able in all countries that host large prevention or clinical
trials sponsored by US government agencies.’11 But the
quoted arguments suggest that research participants,
in particular, deserve treatment: the relationship with a
participant gives the researcher special duties to that par-
ticipant, just as the physician-patient relationship gives
a doctor special duties to her patients, not to someone
else’s. It is implausible that this relationship gives
PEPFAR obligations to the participants’ compatriots.
Similarly, with regard to HIV/AIDS treatment trials,
the US National Institutes of Health’s 2005 guidance
states that ‘the NIH expects investigators/contractors to
address the provision of antiretroviral treatment to trial
participants after their completion of the trial.’12 It justi-
fies this expectation by reference to the potentially
harmful effects of discontinuing antiretroviral treat-
ment.13 Now, the NIH is generally prohibited from pro-
viding treatment (its remit is restricted to research), so the
suppliers of post-trial ART must be other parties. The
guidance therefore recommends that investigators engage
with other organizations working in the host country –
governmental and non-governmental – to secure
on-going treatment for trial participants.14 This implicitly
presumes that these other organizations have a responsi-
bility to compensate the harm that the research would
otherwise cause (through treatment discontinuation). But
if I hurt someone, it is I, or at most those on whose behalf
I am working, who ought to repair the damage, not inno-
cent bystanders.
These examples illustrate the mistake of divorcing the
justifications given for providing post-trial ART from the
mechanisms proposed for supplying it. In the following
sections I analyze the possible justifications for an obli-
gation to supply post-trial ART to participants in
HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention trials. For each
justification I explain the moral principle (or principles)
that underlie the justification, and show to whom the
principle assigns duties and to whom the duty is owed
(Table 1). This links the mechanisms that have been pro-
posed for supplying ART to trial participants to the
reasons that have been given for doing so. For each jus-
tification I also note what evidence would need to be
provided in order for that justification to require the
provision of post-trial ART for a particular trial.
B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUPPLYING
POST-TRIAL TREATMENT
5. Harm to participants
There is widespread support for an obligation to compen-
sate research participants for injuries that result from
their participation in research.15 Arguments citing this
obligation are perhaps the most common way to defend
the claim that participants who seroconvert during
vaccine trials deserve ART. For example, according to
Udo Schüklenk and Richard Ashcroft at least some par-
ticipants in vaccine trials will have a ‘therapeutic miscon-
ception’ that makes them think that they have received an
effective vaccine. This will lead to them engaging in more
risky behavior than they otherwise would have, and
thereby increase the probability that they contract HIV.16
More recently, both microbicide and vaccine trials have
been halted because infection rates were higher in the
experimental than the control arms. In both cases some
physiological effect of the experimental treatment might
have made infection more likely, though whether this is
the case and exactly what the mechanism of action might
be is still unknown.17
Harm-based arguments have also been developed for
treatment trials. Here, trial participation cannot be impli-
cated in HIV-infection, since participants enter the trials
in need of treatment. Instead, the arguments must show
that taking people off treatment would cause a harm that
should be restituted with ART. For example, it may be
that putting someone on ART for a limited period of time
11 Ibid: 1230.
12 National Institutes of Health. 2005. Guidance for Addressing the
Provision of Antiretroviral Treatment for Trial Participants Following
their Completion of NIH-Funded HIV Antiretroviral Treatment Trials
in Developing Countries. Available at: http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-038.html [Accessed 2 July 2008].
13 US Department of Health and Human Services. 2005. Questions and
Answers Regarding Guidance for Addressing the Provision of Antiret-
roviral Treatment for Trial Participants Following their Completion of
NIH-Funded HIV Antiretroviral Treatment Trials in Developing
Countries. http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/antiretroviral/QandA.
htm [Accessed 2 July 2008]: Answers 1 and 5.
14 Ibid: Answers 9 and 10.
15 E.g., Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences,
World Health Organization. 2002. International Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. Geneva: CIOMS:
Guideline 19.
16 Schüklenk & Ashcroft, op. cit. note 2, p. 168.
17 P. Moszynski. Halt to Microbicide Trial Sets Back AIDS Research.
BMJ 2007; 334. Subsequent analysis of the data from the STEP vaccine
trials suggested that the group at increased risk of HIV infection was
uncircumcised men with pre-existing immunity to adenovirus type 5
(Ad5), the virus used as the carrier for the HIV genes in the vaccine
(National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH. 2008.
NIAIDWill NotMove ForwardWith The Pave 100 HIV Vaccine Trial.
Bethesda, MD: NIH. Available at: http://www.nih.gov/news/health/
jul2008/niaid-17.htm [Accessed 12 Jan 2009]).
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increases the probability that they will develop resistance
to the antiretrovirals used; this may compromise future
care.18 There is also some limited data that suggests that
ART interruption may be implicated in an increased risk
of cardiovascular disease.19
The likelihood that a participant’s AIDS constitutes a
research-related injury deserving compensation with
ART will vary from trial to trial. Two key factors
should be borne in mind. First, for almost every trial
some of the people who have HIV/AIDS after the trial
would have it independent of trial participation.
(Indeed, given the state-of-the-art preventive methods
normally used as the standard of care in vaccine trials,
some participants who would otherwise have contracted
HIV will not have done so.) Second, even for those
people who are in need as a result of the trial, their need
is likely to be only partly caused by trial participation.20
This is clearest in the case of post-trial access for treat-
ment trials: even if, say, stopping antiretrovirals turned
out to be harmful, participants already needed treat-
ment before they enrolled. Strictly speaking, compensa-
tion is owed only to those people who need treatment
because of the trial, and only to the extent that trial
participation causes their need.
Suppose that the appropriate evidential standard were
met for some group of trial participants. On whom would
the obligation to supply ART fall? This depends on what
underlies the obligation to compensate research-related
injuries. First, it might be a requirement of reciprocity.
Having borne the burden and taken the risks of research
participation, it has been argued, research participants
should not have to pay the costs of treatment when they
are hurt. Instead, the costs should fall on those who
benefit from the research.21 In Section 7 I consider in
detail who has obligations of reciprocity and how far they
extend.
Second, and more simply, it may be a case of restitu-
tion for causing harm: if one person harms another
without her consent, then he should do what he can to
return her to the condition she was in before the harm (or
to provide some equivalent compensatory benefit). This
obligation would fall specifically on the researchers and,
where the harm resulted not from negligence but from
trial design, the sponsors who employed them. Third
parties would not have any obligation to supply treat-
ment on this basis: I should not interfere with people
fulfilling their special responsibilities, but neither do I
have a duty to assist them.
In addition to the difficulties noted above in showing
that participants’ need for ART was caused by trial par-
ticipation, there is another problem with applying this
principle of restitution. Participants’ consent to trial par-
ticipation might be thought to constitute assuming the
risks of accidental injury. And if someone has consented
to be injured, the person who injures them does not owe
restitution. Consequently, for this principle to justify
post-trial treatment it would also have to be shown either
that participants failed to give valid consent, or that the
harm they experienced was the result of culpable negli-
gence. The argument would be most plausible in the
scenario suggested by Schüklenk and Ashcroft: the
participants would not have had the mistaken beliefs
(therapeutic misconception) that led to their risky behav-
ior if they had properly understood the nature of the trial
when they enrolled. It therefore indicates that something
went wrong in the consent process, which implies that
they did not consent to be harmed. In other cases, the
argument would be much harder to make.
6. Fiduciary relationships
The role of physician is commonly thought to come with
special responsibilities: physicians have duties to their
patients that they do not have to others. Though
researchers and physicians are distinct roles, medical
researchers may also have special duties to their subjects.
Such duties could include providing post-trial treatment.
The most detailed account of the special duties that
researchers qua researchers have to their participants
is Henry Richardson and Leah Belsky’s account of
18 G. Jourdain et al. Perinatal HIV Prevention Trial Group. Intrapar-
tum Exposure to Nevirapine and Subsequent Maternal Responses to
Nevirapine-based Antiretroviral Therapy. N Engl J Med 2004; 351:
229–240. See, also, S. Sungkanuparph et al. HIV-1 Genotype after
Interruption of Non-nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor-based
Antiretroviral Therapy and Virological Response after Resumption of
the Same Regimen. Int J STD AIDS 2007; 18: 832–834.
19 A.N. Phillips et al. Interruption of Antiretroviral Therapy and Risk
of Cardiovascular Disease in Persons with HIV-1 Infection: Explor-
atory Analyses from the SMART Trial. Antivir Ther 2008; 13: 177–187.
20 For analysis of the data on the risk-taking behavior of participants in
HIV-prevention trials see Slack et al. op. cit. note 4. They conclude that
there is no good evidence that overall risk behavior of trial participants
increases, and that it is possible to identify specific individuals who may
engage in more risky behavior. Schüklenk and Ashcroft address the
implications of this analysis in U. Schüklenk & R. Ashscroft. HIV
Vaccine Trials: Reconsidering the Therapeutic Misconception and the
Question of What Constitutes Trial Related Injury. Dev World Bioeth
2007; 7(3): ii–iv.
21 E.g., J.F. Childress. Compensating Injured Research Subjects: I. The
Moral Argument. Hastings Cent Rep, 1976; 6(6): 21–27.
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‘ancillary care’ obligations.22 Richardson and Belsky
argue that these obligations arise from research partici-
pants’ ‘partial-entrustment’ of their health to researchers.
This partial-entrustment includes the disclosure of medi-
cal information, the tests that participants undergo, and
the control they give researchers over their treatment.
The scope of clinical of researchers’ ancillary care obliga-
tions is determined by the nature of what is entrusted.
Thus only those conditions that are being studied or are
likely to be diagnosed by study procedures may merit
additional care. The strength of the obligations is deter-
mined by the vulnerability of the participants, the grati-
tude researchers owe them for trial participation, and
the intensity and duration of the relationship between
researchers and participants. The greatest ancillary care
obligations will therefore be owed to participants who
desperately need health care that they cannot get else-
where, who have been heavily burdened by trial partici-
pation, and who have developed a deep relationship with
the researchers.
Supposing that Richardson and Belsky’s account is
correct,23 we can assess what characteristics a trial must
have in order for researchers to acquire an ancillary care
obligation to provide ART. In a recent article Richard-
son considers the hypothetical case of participants who
seroconvert in a Phase-III HIV vaccine trial.24 He argues
that the participants are likely to be very vulnerable,
that long-term interactions between participants and
researchers imply a deep relationship, and that partici-
pants’ HIV-status falls centrally within the scope of the
study. Moreover, the cost of providing treatment for
those who seroconvert, relative to the overall cost of the
study, is likely to be low. Richardson suggests that this
gives researchers a strong obligation to provide treat-
ment. Presumably, the same factors would apply in treat-
ment studies, too, though likely with different relative
costs, since everyone in a treatment study leaves the study
needing ART. In this case, either the study budget would
have to be large enough to support the cost of treatment
comfortably, or the relationship between participants
and researchers would have to be especially deep. Each of
these factors varies from trial to trial.25
Were this burden of proof to be met, the resulting duty
to supply ART would fall on the researchers, since it is
they who are in the fiduciary relationship. However, as
with research related injuries, sponsors will normally
share responsibility. If I hire you to do something which
will predictably lead to you acquiring costly responsibili-
ties, a fair pay deal should include the costs of fulfilling
these responsibilities. Thus, the sponsors of research may
also be obligated to help fulfil duties arising from the
researcher-participant relationship. Again, however,
other third parties are not.
7. Reciprocity
The goal of medical research is to contribute to general-
izable knowledge that can improve the health of human
beings. Clinical trials are therefore primarily designed to
answer scientific questions and only secondarily, if at
all, to benefit trial participants. But since participants
contribute to a benefit derived by others, it may be that
they deserve something in return. This is the idea under-
lying duties of reciprocity, which a number of commen-
tators cite as a justification for supplying ART to trial
participants.26
Where individuals are owed reciprocal benefits, it is in
virtue of the benefits they have provided to others; and
what they are owed reflects their relative contribution.
However, not everyone who is benefited owes her bene-
factor reciprocation. Suppose, for example, that you
decide to spend an afternoon clearing an overgrown
public path. This may benefit other people who use the
path, but you cannot therefore demand that they pay
you. By contrast, if I hire you to clear the path, then I owe
you fair compensation for doing so; and if you are so
hired and bring along a friend to assist you, you ought to
share the payment you receive with her. What makes the
difference in these last two cases is that the other people
are voluntarily engaged in the enterprise that generates the
22 H.S. Richardson, L. Belsky. The Ancillary-care Responsibilities of
Medical Researchers. Hastings Cent Rep 2004; 34: 25–33. They define
ancillary care as ‘that which goes beyond the requirements of scientific
validity, safety, keeping promises, or rectifying injuries’. (p. 26). Though
their theory was developed to help determine the obligations of
researchers during a trial, it is clear from Richardson’s later uses that it
applies to post-trial obligations as well.
23 Space does not permit critical assessment of the account here (some
critical reflections can be found in N. Dickert et al. Ancillary-care
Responsibilities in Observational Research: Two Cases, Two Issues.
Lancet 2007; 369: 874–877). It is worth noting that the account incor-
porates a number of moral considerations – such as reciprocity and the
duty of rescue – that I also consider separately in this paper. It is
therefore unclear exactly what difference the relationship alone makes.
24 H. S. Richardson. Gradations of Researchers’ Obligation to Provide
Ancillary Care for HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries. Am J Public
Health 2007; 97: 1956–1961.
25 For example, treatment trials sponsored by the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the US NIH vary in length from 12
weeks to 5 years (Seema Shah, personal communication).
26 E.g. Lo et al., op. cit. note 2; Macklin, op.cit. note 2.
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benefit, either by commissioning it to be done or by
taking part in doing it.27
In the case of research, the other parties engaged in the
research enterprise are primarily the researchers and their
sponsors. It is they who enlist participants into the study,
and so it is plausible to think that it is they who ought to
bear the cost of fair reciprocation for the participants’
contribution. Though HIV/AIDS patients28 outside of
the study may benefit from research on their condition,
they are not voluntary partners in the research enterprise,
and so need not reciprocate. (It might be that they should
be grateful, since someone can have reason to be grateful
to someone who benefits her without asking her first; but
duties of gratitude are quite different from, and weaker
than, duties of reciprocity.)29 This implies that it would be
unfair to demand that patients sacrifice their health care
to return a benefit to trial participants, for example, by
prioritizing trial participants for treatment at government
health centers.30
Someone might object to this last conclusion in the
following way: ‘If a government sponsors research, or
even if it just facilitates research by allowing trials to take
place on its territory, the government is part of the
research enterprise and so incurs duties to provide recip-
rocal benefits. But governments act on behalf of their
citizens: legitimate governments express the will of their
citizens and, by implication, the responsibilities that gov-
ernments incur are the responsibilities of their citizens.
Thus, people with HIV/AIDS may acquire duties of
reciprocation to trial participants through the actions of
their government.’ However, even if the assumption
about governments underlying this reasoning were
correct (and, at best, it is an idealization of functioning
democracies), it would still not follow that the responsi-
bilities in question would be incurred just by HIV/AIDS
patients. The actions of a legitimate government are on
behalf of all of its citizens, and so the obligations belong
to all its citizens, too – not just some subset of them.
Government taxation and expenditure decisions are (at
least for the most part) constrained by considerations of
distributive justice. Thus, if a national government does
have an obligation to provide reciprocal benefits to trial
participants, the cost of meeting that obligation should be
met by spreading the burden fairly among all its citizens,
not by penalizing HIV/AIDS patients. It is worth noting
that this point applies to any obligations governments
may acquire through sponsoring research: they are not
normally at liberty to discharge these obligations at the
expense of any particular group.
In order to show that ART is an appropriate return for
participation in a particular HIV/AIDS trial a number of
factors must be assessed.31 Most importantly, the amount
of compensation that participants are owed will depend
on the size of the contribution they make and the extent
of the benefit (broadly understood) generated by the
research.32 This will clearly vary between trials, but we
can note two key points. First, whatever the final distri-
bution of benefits, no one should be made worse off by
fulfilling their duties of reciprocity. This follows from the
point of reciprocity: it is an appropriate response to ben-
efits received.33 Second, the amount might be more or less
than the cost of providing ART: there is no reason to
expect a priori that what someone is owed for her contri-
bution to a particular piece of HIV/AIDS research will be
equivalent to a lifetime of treatment.
8. Beneficence and global justice
International medical research takes place against a
background of extreme economic disparities, which are
reflected in massive differences in health and health care
27 I leave this idea of voluntary engagement vague, since there is not
space for proper analysis of the precise limits of reciprocal duties here.
It should not affect my central point.
28 Or people at risk for acquiring HIV/AIDS in the case of prevention
studies.
29 For a classic analysis of duties of gratitude see F. Berger. Gratitude.
Ethics 1975; 85: 298–309. Space constraints and the relative weakness of
duties of gratitude preclude my giving them serious consideration as an
independent ground for an obligation to supply post-trial ART.
30 See M. Merritt & C. Grady. Reciprocity and Post-Trial Access for
Participants in Antiretroviral Therapy TrialsAIDS 2006; 20: 1791–1794
for a detailed analysis of whether and when it would be permissible to
prioritize research participants for treatment, on the assumption that
they are owed reciprocation by their compatriots.
31 For reasons of space I omit some of these considerations. For
example, I have not considered the difficult question of how to measure
someone’s contribution, nor the relative merits of different sorts of
contribution.
32 The relevant contribution for assessing desert is the ex ante contri-
bution. This means that, in general, each participant in any particular
trial will make the same sized contribution, and so deserve the same
reward. In particular, in HIV prevention trials there is no difference in
the contribution made to scientific knowledge by those who sero-
convert and those who do not – each is equally important for assessing
the effects of the study intervention (see Weijer and LeBlanc, op. cit.
note 4, pp. 802–803 for a more complete argument to this effect). Note,
however, that even if every participant deserves an equal benefit, it may
still be appropriate to supply it by giving care just to those who are
infected. The benefit supplied here would be the equivalent of giving
each participant HIV-related health insurance. Finally, it is worth
noting that if a trial enrolled different types of participants (e.g. healthy
volunteers and patients) this might make a difference to their expected
contributions and so to what they were owed as a matter of reciprocity.
33 Cf. Merritt & Grady, op. cit. note 30, p. 1792.
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between rich and poor.34 In most developing countries
that host HIV/AIDS research, large numbers of people
who need ART cannot get it. In contrast, in the devel-
oped world, ART is accessible to nearly everyone. Some
people think that these differences affect what is owed
to research participants in developing countries, either
because it is unjust that they lack treatment when others
have it, or simply because of the urgency of their need.35
In this section I consider how an obligation to provide
ART to trial participants might be grounded in duties of
justice or beneficence. Since the same critical considera-
tions apply to both, I consider them together.
Duties of beneficence require us to act in ways that
increase the welfare of others. There are two sources of
these duties. First, everyone has a limited obligation to do
something to improve other people’s welfare, and some
discretion about how to discharge this duty. This is the
imperfect duty of beneficence.36 I could discharge my
imperfect duty of beneficence by volunteering at the local
homeless shelter, by campaigning to clean up the Chesa-
peake Bay, or by babysitting my neighbor’s children.
Second, everyone has a duty of rescue, which requires her
to provide urgent assistance to others where she can do so
at a (morally) insignificant cost to herself.37 For example,
if I have training in first aid and I see someone collapse
on the sidewalk, I have a duty to try to help, even if this
makes me late for my 9 a.m. faculty meeting.
Providing trial participants with ART would clearly be
a way in which someone could discharge their imperfect
duty of beneficence. Moreover, it could be argued that
the duty of rescue requires it, provided that its cost in
a particular context was low enough, since without
treatment people with AIDS will die. Furthermore, since
both duties of beneficence are general duties they fall on
everyone.38 Hence unlike, say, duties arising from the
researcher-participant relationship, a duty of beneficence
to supply ART could fall to governments or international
bodies who are entirely independent of the research enter-
prise. Thus all the mechanisms that have been suggested
for getting ART to trial participants would be legitimate
ways to meet a duty of beneficence.
Theories of global justice are still young, and a number
of fundamental problems regarding the scope and bearers
of duties of justice have yet to be solved.39 Let us,
however, suppose for the sake of argument that there is
some duty to promote global justice possessed by indi-
viduals, and see what this would imply for the present
case.
Like duties of beneficence, the duty to promote global
justice is likely to be general – everyone will have it, not
just those people who interact face to face with the global
poor. Consequently, there is no reason to think that
researchers working in the developing world have any
greater duty to promote justice than people who are not,
where those people could also make a difference.40 This
implies, as with beneficence, that all the suggested mecha-
nisms for supplying ART could be legitimate ways to
fulfil a duty to promote justice.
The central problem with using either beneficence or
justice to ground an obligation to supply ART to trial
participants is that neither gives us reason to privilege
trial participants over other equally needy people. Duties
of beneficence and duties to rectify injustice are grounded
in the unfortunate situation of the beneficiaries; they are
not dependent on the beneficiaries participating in clini-
cal trials. But the participants in clinical trials are not, by
virtue of participation, worse off with regard to welfare
or distributive justice than their compatriots; nor is treat-
ment with antiretrovirals the only or most urgent need
that people have. Hence in order to show, in some par-
ticular case, that justice or beneficence required prioritiz-
ing research participants, some additional reason would
be needed.
34 United Nations Development Programme. 2007. Human Develop-
ment Report 2007/2008. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 219–384.
35 E.g., UNAIDS/WHO. 2007. Ethical considerations in biomedical HIV
prevention trials. Geneva: UNAIDS: 48. K. Shapiro & S.R. Benatar.
HIV Prevention Research and Global Inequality: Steps Towards
Improved Standards of Care. J Med Ethics 2005; 31: 39–47; WHO-
UNAIDS Report. Treating People with Intercurrent Infection in HIV
Prevention Trials: Report from a WHO/UNAIDS Consultation,
Geneva July 17–18, 2003. AIDS 2004; 18: W4.
36 Cf. I. Kant. [1797] 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical
philosophy / Immanuel Kant. Mary J. Gregor, trans & ed.; general intro-
duction by Allen Wood. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press.
37 The duty of rescue is called a duty of ‘specific beneficence’ by Beau-
champ and Childress, who give a more comprehensive list of the con-
ditions under which it applies (T.L. Beauchamp & J.F. Childress. 2001.
Principles of Biomedical Ethics 5th edn. New York: Oxford University
Press: 171).
38 General duties are possessed by moral agents just in virtue of their
agency, and owed to moral patients just in virtue of their moral status.
39 One important debate concerns the extent to which considerations of
justice apply internationally. Some argue that the requirements of dis-
tributive justice that apply to the basic structure of a nation state are
much more stringent than those that apply to the global order (e.g.
J. Rawls. 1999. The Law of Peoples; with ‘The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited’. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Others think
that justice applies globally just as much as it applies nationally (e.g.
C.R. Beitz. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
40 Indeed, if they are conducting research that responds to the health
needs of poor communities, researchers may be already playing their
part in correcting injustice (cf. Weijer & LeBlanc, op. cit. note 4, p. 804).
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One possible reason would be that helping research
participants would contribute more to overall justice or
well-being than other uses of the same resources. This
could be the case if it were more efficient to treat them
than other people. For example, suppose a research
project built treatment facilities and trained personnel to
carry out its HIV/AIDS treatment study in a rural com-
munity. Though the community would not have been the
preferred location for a treatment center if the govern-
ment were planning from scratch, it is much cheaper to
take over an existing facility than to build a new one.
Moreover, if the same treatment center were to be used, it
might also make sense for it to serve much the same
population. In these circumstances it could be eminently
reasonable for the program to continue to treat the trial
participants: this would enable the government to treat
more people at the same cost. Arguably, this is a better
way for the government to discharge its duties than less
efficient delivery of health care.
Thus, if insisting on the provision of ART to HIV/
AIDS trial participants makes the world a better place,
either by improving people’s welfare or making it more
just, this might justify prioritizing them. If it does not, but
merely shifts resources around, then it cannot be a
requirement of beneficence or justice. In each case, unless
we have good reason to think that the former is true, we
should conclude that neither duties of beneficence nor
requirements of distributive justice imply that HIV/AIDS
research participants, in particular, should be targeted.41
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
9. Key lessons about the provision of ART
Table 1 summarizes my conclusions regarding connec-
tions between the suggested justifications for an obliga-
tion to provide post-trial ART and the bearers of the
obligations. In addition to my conclusions regarding
particular justifications, the analysis allows us to draw
several useful general conclusions.
First, it indicates that, in general, justifications that
would place the onus on government programs – such as
beneficence and justice – imply a similar obligation to
people outside of medical research. On the other hand,
justifications that would imply an obligation owed to
research participants in particular – like compensation
for harm or the research-participant relationship – tend
to be those that obligate just the researchers and their
sponsors.
Second, we can assess what should happen to the
global amount and distribution of resources to treat HIV/
AIDS. Considerations of beneficence and distributive
justice require that we look at all the total consequences
of providing treatment to trial participants. They will not
justify making people worse off or the world less just, on
aggregate, in order to benefit trial participants. If trial
participants have incurred substantial research related
injuries, if the researcher-participant relationship is of
sufficient intensity, or if the wider benefits of the research
are great enough, then researchers and sponsors may
have a duty to provide post-trial treatment to their par-
ticipants. But they may not do this by diverting treatment
that would otherwise have gone to different patients;
instead, they must contribute resources for treat-
ment themselves. Even if governments with HIV/AIDS
treatment programs incur special obligations to trial
41 Similar considerations would apply if the justification cited historical
instead of present injustices. For example, rich countries might owe
poorer countries reparations for the harms of colonialism. Again,
however, these reparations would not be owed to research participants
in particular.
Table 1. Possible Justifications for providing post-trial treatment
Justification Duty bearer Duty owed to Benefits owed
Harm to
participants
The responsible causes of injuries
i.e. researchers, sponsors
Only those injured by research procedures
i.e. injured participants
Compensation proportional to harm
Fiduciary
relationship
Trustees in the relationship
i.e. researchers, sponsors
Beneficiaries in the relationship
i.e. participants
Depends on vulnerability of participants,
gratitude owed, and depth of relationship
Reciprocity Beneficiaries who facilitated the research
i.e. researchers, sponsors, governments
who facilitate research
Contributors to research
i.e. participants, researchers, sponsors,
governments who facilitate research
A fair share of the benefits generated by
research
Duty of rescue All those who can help People in urgent need Provision of vital assistance if at low cost
Imperfect duty
of beneficence
All those who can help People in need Contribution to increase in total welfare
Global justice All those who can help People in unjust situations Contribution to making the world more just
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participants, they may not meet these obligations by
penalizing citizens with HIV/AIDS, but must spread the
cost fairly, which will increase the total resources they
direct towards ART.42 A key lesson, then, is that the
fulfillment of any of these obligations should maintain or
increase the total global provision of ART.
Third, even if they justify duties of care to trial partici-
pants, the justifications considered do not all imply that
ART, in particular, should be provided. In the case of
HIV-infection as a research related injury, ART seems
like an appropriate response, since this is the only way to
approximate repairing the damage done. But in the case
of the researcher-participant relationship, a particular
trial might involve only brief interactions over a short
period of time, which would imply only limited ancillary
care obligations. Likewise, the extent of duties of recip-
rocation depends on the size of the benefit generated by
the particular trial, which will vary. Thus how much is
owed will differ from trial to trial. In some cases it may be
that ART need not be given at all in order to discharge
the duties; in other cases, ART may be appropriate, but
for a limited period of time. It is not possible to determine
exactly what is owed without looking at the details of
particular research projects.
This last point brings me to an important reminder:
any argument to show that trial participants should be
given post-trial ART must show that for that particular
trial the appropriate burden of proof has been met. For
each putative justification, I have indicated what would
have to be shown for an obligation to result. However, I
have not assessed the likelihood that any particular trial
meets the burden of proof.
10. Conclusion
It is not enough to decide that participants in HIV/AIDS
trials ought to get treatment after the trial ends and then
look for ways to direct resources to them. The reasons
why trial participants should get ART affect who has the
duty to provide it. We should not burden governments
with the obligations of sponsors, nor researchers with the
obligations of the international community. And we
should not deprive a group of treatment because their
need is less salient than that of research participants.
Insisting otherwise may lead to people being wrongfully
deprived of treatment.
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